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Abstract
Background: Phishing is a widely known phenomenon, but currently lacks a commonly accepted definition. As a
result, many studies about phishing use their own definition. The lack of a common definition prevents knowledge
accumulation and makes analysing studies or aggregating data about phishing a difficult task.
Method: To develop a definition, we used existing definitions as input and combined them using crime science
theories as the theoretical framework. A systematic review of the literature up to August 2013 was conducted,
resulting in 2458 publications mentioning the word phishing. All journal articles, together with both highly cited and
recent conference papers were selected, giving a total of 536 peer-reviewed publications (22%) to be manually
reviewed. This resulted in 113 distinct definitions to be analysed.
Results: An analysis identified key concepts that were found in most definitions and formed the building blocks for a
consensual definition. We propose a new definition that is based upon current ones, which defines phishing in a
comprehensive way and - in our opinion - addresses all important elements of phishing: ‘phishing is a scalable act of
deception whereby impersonation is used to obtain information from a target’.
Conclusions: A consensual definition allows future research to be aligned and it facilitates the interpretation and
comparison of existing research. The findings suggest that the routine activity approach can be applied to the digital
world. Finally, the ‘scalability’ concept of our definition provides a new theoretical notion to digital crime that is
independent of the employed channel.
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Background
The term phishing is currently widely used with thousands
of mentions in the scientific literature, lots of media cov-
erage and widespread attention from organisations such
as banks and law enforcement agencies. However, this
prompts a question: what exactly is phishing? In some
publications, the phenomenon of phishing is explicitly
defined; in some, it is described by means of an example,
while others assume that the reader already knows what
phishing is. Many authors propose their own definition of
phishing, leading to a large number of different definitions
in the scientific literature.
With no scientific consensus, other sources could
provide a standard definition. The first point of ref-
erence for finding the definition of a word would be
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a dictionary. Four definitions from prominent English
dictionaries are shown in Table 1. Additionally, it lists the
definition of the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG),
a non-profit foundation that keeps track of phishing.
The APWG definition is rather lengthy compared to
the dictionary definitions. The five definitions vary in
the level of detail and the scope of the phenomenon.
For example, whereas the American Heritage definition
includes phone calls, the others do not. In addition,
the goal of phishing differs in the definitions, ranging
from financial account details (Collins, APWG) to the
more general personal information (Oxford, Merriam-
Webster, American Heritage). There is greater consen-
sus about the origin of the term phishing; it was first
used around 1995–1996 (James 2005; Khonji et al.
2013; Press 2013; Purkait 2012) and is a variation on
the word ‘fishing’, something hackers commonly did
(James 2005; McFedries 2006; Press 2013; Purkai 2012).
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Table 1 Definitions of phishing from four dictionaries and
the APWG
Source Definition
Oxford University The fraudulent practice of sending emails
Press (2014), UK purporting to be from reputable companies
in order to induce individuals to reveal
personal information, such as passwords and
credit card numbers, online.
Collins English The practice of using fraudulent e-mails and
Dictionary (2013), UK copies of legitimate websites to extract
financial data from computer users for
purposes of identity theft.
Merriam-Webster (2013), A scam by which an e-mail user is duped into
USA revealing personal or confidential information
which the scammer can use illicitly.
American Heritage To request confidential information over the
Dictionary (2013), USA Internet or by telephone under false
pretenses in order to fraudulently obtain
credit card numbers, passwords, or other
personal data.
Anti-PhishingWorking Phishing is a criminal mechanism employing
Group (2013) both social engineering and technical
subterfuge to steal consumers’ personal
identity data and financial account
credentials. Social engineering schemes use
spoofed e-mails purporting to be from
legitimate businesses and agencies, designed
to lead consumers to counterfeit websites
that trick recipients into divulging financial
data such as usernames and passwords.
Technical subterfuge schemes plant
crimeware onto PCs to steal credentials
directly, often using systems to intercept
consumers online account user names and
passwords – and to corrupt local navigational
infrastructures to misdirect consumers to
counterfeit websites (or authentic websites
through phisher-controlled proxies used to
monitor and intercept consumers’ keystrokes).
In common with fishing, phishing is about setting out
‘hooks’, hoping to get a ‘bite’.
The lack of a standard definition of phishing has been
observed previously (Abu-Nimeh et al. 2007; Al-Hamar
et al. 2011; Khonji et al. 2013). This causes several prob-
lems for scientists, practitioners and consumers. For sci-
entists, it is difficult to compare research on phishing
in a meaningful way. Aggregating research consists of
classification (in which attacks are considered phishing),
and identification (measuring how often it occurs). Fur-
thermore, countermeasures against phishing cannot be
effectively evaluated without knowing the extent of the
phenomenon. Additionally, having no standard defini-
tion is an indication of the immaturity of the field with
researchers refining their own definitions over the years
(e.g., (Kumaraguru et al. 2010, 2007), (Moore 2007;Moran
and Moore 2010) and (Hong 2012; Xiang and Hong 2009;
Xiang et al. 2011)). Institutions, such as banks or govern-
ments, face problems understanding one another if their
definitions of phishing are different. For example, one
bank may consider a fraudulent phone call to be phishing,
whereas another bank will not, making a comparison
of victimisation or countermeasures difficult. Consumers
may also experience the downside of a lack of a stan-
dard definition. Persons who are less computer literate, for
example, may become confused when several awareness
campaigns describe phishing differently.
We aim to clarify the definition of the phishing phe-
nomenon by analysing existing definitions, in contrast
to most standard definitions, which are developed using
expert panels. The resulting definition is based on con-
sensus drawn from literature, and is sufficiently abstract
to support future developments. To the best of our knowl-
edge, no previous attempt has been made to synthesise a
definition of phishing.
In order to interpret existing definitions of phishing
in the right context, one needs a theoretical framework.
An initial exploration revealed that phishing contains ele-
ments from criminal activities. Crime science theories
are used for crime in the physical world, which raises
the question of their applicability in the digital world.
Previous research supports the idea of applying crime
science theories to digital crime (Pratt et al. 2010; Reyns
et al. 2011; Yar 2005) and there is limited evidence of
its applicability to phishing (Hutchings and Hayes 2009).
Therefore, crime science theories are used to achieve
a better understanding of phishing and to provide us
with concepts to analyse it. The focus of crime science
is on the opportunity for a crime, rather than on the
characteristics of the criminal. Three theories on crime
opportunity form the foundation of crime science (Clarke
2009; Felson and Clarke 1998): the Rational Choice Per-
spective; Crime Pattern Theory; and the Routine Activity
Approach. Each of these theories takes a distinctly differ-
ent approach to crime (Clarke 2009). The rational choice
perspective offers a view on offender’s decision-making,
assuming bounded rationality (Cornish and Clarke 2008).
An offender is assumed to make a rational decision and
commit a crime if the perceived benefit outweighs the
perceived cost. Crime pattern theory (Brantingham and
Brantingham 1993, 2008) focuses on the relation between
crime and the physical environment, in particular the
crime opportunities that emerge in the daily lives of the
offender. According to crime pattern theory, crime is not
randomly distributed in time and space. For example,
a potential offender may come across opportunities for
crime during his regular daily commute. Finally, the rou-
tine activity approach (Cohen and Felson 1979) states that
a crime occurs when a likely offender and a suitable tar-
get converge in the absence of a capable guardian. Routine
activity theory can be interpreted broadly (Pratt et al.
2010; Reyns et al. 2011) to include crime without direct
contact. For example, in the case of cyber bullying an
Lastdrager Crime Science 2014, 3:9 Page 3 of 10
http://www.crimesciencejournal.com/content/3/1/9
online chat room can be the location where an offender
and victim “meet”. The focus on offender decisionmaking
within the rational choice perspective makes this the-
ory less suited for reasoning about phishing, since the
offender is mostly unknown. Similarly, applying crime pat-
tern theory is difficult for phishing, since it often occurs
on the Internet. The routine activity approach however, is
applicable to phishing (Hutchings and Hayes 2009) with
concepts such as offender and target, especially useful.
To elaborate upon the routine activity approach, crime
scripts (Cornish 1994; Schank and Abelson 1975) can be
used. Crime scripts describe the sequential steps that lead
to an offence, much like a film script. Using crime scripts
allows for interpretation of definitions of phishing in such
a way that the act of phishing is decomposed into sev-
eral steps. An example of such a step is “Victim receives
an email”. To fully understand each definition, we decom-
pose each step into several key concepts. To structure the
identification and classification of these concepts, we use
the 3A model El (Helou et al. 2010). The 3A model is an
activity-centric framework that provides three categories:
Actors, Assets and Activities. In the context of phishing,
actors are humans (e.g., the offenders) who conduct activ-
ities (e.g., send a message) to achieve their goal. The goal
itself could be to obtain an asset (e.g., credentials). The
routine activity approach together with the tools of crime
scripts and the 3A model, are used to identify relevant
concepts within each definition.
The goal of the literature search is to find scientific defi-
nitions of phishing. We formulated the following research
question: How is phishing defined in the research com-
munity? Three steps are taken to generate a definition.
Firstly, relevant literature is selected and definitions of
phishing are extracted. Secondly, the concepts of phishing
are extracted and scored according to their occurrence.
Finally, concepts that are found in most definitions are




To obtain data on the existing definitions of phishing, a
systematic study of the peer-reviewed scientific literature
was performed, following the guidelines of Kitchenham
(Kitchenham and Charters 2007). Three digital libraries
were selected for the search: ACM digital library,
IEEEXplore and Scopus. The fields relevant to phishing,
such as computer science and various social sciences (i.e.,
psychology or criminology), are covered by these three
databases. The literature search (see Figure 1) resulted in
2458 publications up to August 2013 that used the word
‘phishing’ in the title, abstract or keywords.We filtered the
publications based on our exclusion criteria: studies had
to be written in English to be included in our selection, so
n=414 n=978 n=1076
Figure 1 Search, selection and review of the results.
that we could run a syntactical analysis on them, and had
to be peer-reviewed.
After filtering, the literature set was narrowed down to
312 journal articles and 1774 conference papers. Since
it was not feasible to read all publications, we created a
subset of the literature to be reviewed manually. Journals
generally have less strict review deadlines than confer-
ences, resulting in longer reviews and possibly higher
quality. In addition, generally journals have higher limits
on the number of pages, resulting in more in-depth arti-
cles. Therefore, we included all 312 journal articles in the
review. Turning to the 1774 conference papers, we note
that in the field of computer science, publishing in con-
ference proceedings is generally favoured (Freyne et al.
2010), whereas journals are preferred in other fields. For
the conference papers, we used the number of citations
as an indication of quality and based our selection on this
criterion. This resulted in the inclusion of 135 conference
papers with more than 10 citations each. However, the
selection based on citation count may exclude high quality
conference publications that have recently been published
and thereby have not yet received many citations. There-
fore, we included all 69 recent conference papers from
2013 (from January to August) and the 20 newest from
2012.
All 536 eligible publications were manually searched for
definitions of phishing by performing a case-insensitive
search for the word ‘phish’, so that abbreviations within
the paper would also be covered. If a definition was
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present, it was extracted for further analysis. Studies were
excluded if they: (1) did not include a definition, or at least
a clear and concise description, of the word phishing; or
(2) merely cited a definition of others. If an included paper
cited the definition from another peer-reviewed publica-
tion (7 occurrences), the cited publication was included in
our dataset. The approach involved considering not only
explicit definitions but also descriptions of phishing in
terms of concepts. Definitions had to be one or two sen-
tences in length, but longer definitions were included if
they were clear and to the point. However, publications
giving only a specific example, such as an anecdote, were
not included.
Since the search was performed by a single researcher,
the extraction of definitions was re-evaluated by a sec-
ond researcher by randomly selecting 100 publications
from the dataset. The second researcher then manually
reviewed each publication to identify a definition. The two
sets of results were compared and the inter-rater reliabil-
ity (Cohen’s Kappa) was found to be K = 0.70 (p < 0.001)
with a 95% confidence interval of (0.561, 0.839), indicating
substantial agreement and supporting the feasibility of the
method.
Careful analysis of the 118 extracted definitions resulted
in the exclusion of five of them as non-cited duplicates.
Among the duplicate definitions, we selected the defini-
tion that had been published the earliest and excluded the
others. This reduced our dataset to 113 unique definitions,
all of which can be found in the Additional file 1.
Identification of common words
We initially analysed the definitions in a purely syntac-
tical way (i.e., without context) to obtain an overview
of the most commonly used words. The analysis con-
sisted of a simple frequency count of all words to establish
which ones occur most often. Although a frequency count
removes all contextual information from the individual
words, it does give an indication of the relative impor-
tance of each word compared to all the others. In addition,
words that appear throughout all definitions are probably
important to phishing. All definitions were first processed
by removing all punctuation, putting all words in singular
form and merging different spellings. For example, ‘credit-
card’ became ‘creditcard’, ‘ID theft’ became ‘identity theft’,
and ‘web page’ became ‘webpage’. Multiple occurrences
of a single word were counted only once per definition
to avoid biasing the frequency count. All adverbs were
removed, since they give no additional information in
a frequency count. Finally, the word phishing itself was
removed from all definitions, as counting its occurrences
would not give any insights. The resulting list of def-
initions contains normalised words (i.e., singular form,
one spelling, no punctuation), which was analysed to get
some basic understanding of the concept of phishing. The
result of the frequency count was plotted in a ‘word cloud’
(McNaught and Lam 2010), where the font size of the
words represents the number of occurrences relative to
other words, i.e., the word that is mentioned the most, is
set in the largest font.
Identification of concepts
In order to make sense of the set of definitions, we need
to identify concepts by combining words with common
meaning. This is required since the results of the fre-
quency count are insufficient for words that refer to the
same concept. For example, an attacker, criminal, crook,
conman and variations thereof are all types of offender.
In a simple frequency count, such as a word cloud, these
individual words would occur in low frequencies, but the
overall concept (offender) would occur less frequently.
Firstly, we drew a random sample (n = 20) from the
set of definitions. By analysing this sample and highlight-
ing words, we established which of them were relevant
in each definition. We used the theoretical framework
(crime science, crime scripts, 3A-model) to determine
whether a word is relevant to phishing. The routine activ-
ity approach states that phishing requires a motivated
offender, a suitable target and the absence of a capa-
ble guardian. In the context of phishing, the motivated
offender initiates the phishing attack, the suitable target
is the intended target, and no capable guardian (such as
a phishing filter) is present (Hutchings and Hayes 2009).
For each definition, we tried to identify these actors. Then,
we identified the phases of phishing that each definition
assumes. Hong (2012) identifies three phases: (1) poten-
tial victim receives a message; (2) the victim takes the
suggested action; (3) offender monetises the information.
Others identified phases of phishing from the viewpoint
of the offender (Bose and Leung 2008), or withmore detail
about the methods (Forte 2009). Essentially, these phases
are all high-level crime scripts. Using the phases of phish-
ing as a framework, we identified in what way the defi-
nitions structure a phishing attack. In each definition, we
highlight the words that could relate to a particular phase
of phishing, even when the authors do not identify the
phases explicitly. For example, Herzberg (2009) defines
phishing as ‘Password theft via fake websites’, whereas
Amin et al. (2012) state that phishing is ‘email soliciting
personal information’. Herzberg (2009) focuses on the way
passwords are stolen, not on how potential targets are
drawn to the websites. Amin et al. (2012), on the other
hand, identify the method of attracting potential targets,
but do not explicitly state to whom the personal infor-
mation is sent, or how this is done. Furthermore, after
having highlighted words from the theoretical framework
and words relating to the phases of phishing, any remain-
ing words (i.e., nouns, verbs or adjectives) used to define
the process of phishing are highlighted as well.
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The result of the identification of important words in the
sample of 20 definitions is a list of nouns, verbs and adjec-
tives. In several iterations, synonyms and words referring
to the same concept are merged. For example, the words
‘creditcard numbers’, ‘credentials’ and ‘sensitive data’ refer
to the concept ‘information’. In each iteration, we tried
to find which words were related in an attempt to merge
them into one concept. This resulted in 18 concepts,
categorised as 3 actors, 1 asset and 14 activities (Table 2).
All 93 remaining definitions were analysed using these 18
concepts to see whether they can be described as a subset
of them. A second rater re-evaluated the extraction of con-
cepts. Since the data are based on the output of the raters,
Kappa is not the correct statistic to calculate the level of
agreement (Feinstein and Cicchetti 1990). In this case, the
proportion of agreements (agreements divided by non-
agreements) was used, which was 0.78. This substantial
agreement supports the applicability of the method and
indicates the clarity of the theoretical framework for the
raters.
The results of the frequency count, as shown in the
word cloud, together with the theoretical framework,
were used to label the concepts with the most commonly
used terminology.
Analysis of concepts
All definitions were scored on the 18 identified concepts
that were extracted. Together with the meta-data for each
definition (i.e., year of publication, field and country of
affiliation of first author), the results were entered into
a data file. Frequency analysis was used to determine
which concepts were the most important. This frequency
analysis consists of establishing whether there is consen-
sus within the set of definitions on whether to include
or exclude a concept. For each concept, we determined
whether the definitions agree on either inclusion or exclu-
sion by calculating whether the number of definitions that
use the concept differs significantly (p < 0.05) from 50%
by using Pearson’s chi-square test, the results of which
can be found in Table 2. This results in three categories:
(1) concepts that are used in significantly fewer than 50%
of the definitions; (2) concepts where there is no clear
consensus; (3) concepts that are mentioned in signifi-
cantly more than 50% of the definitions. Concepts where
there is consensus are either included (category 1) or
excluded (category 3). The remaining concepts from cate-
gory 2, where there is no consensus, are considered in the
discussion section.
Finally, we calculate the Pearson’s correlation between
the year of publication and each concept, to identify evo-
lution of the definitions with respect to the emerging
concepts.
Validity
One of the threats to the validity of our study is that the
review was conducted by a single researcher. However,
Table 2 Concepts used in the phishing definitions:χ2-tests are used to determinewhether the frequency of use of a
concept is significantlymore or less than 50%of all definitions
Type Extracted concept Occurrence (N) χ2 p
Asset Mentioning information* 105 83.27 .00
Actor Mentions a target* 87 44.61 .00




Activity Phishing is Internet-based* 84 26.77 .00
Activity Using deception* 79 17.92 .00
Activity Communication from target to offender 64 1.99 .16
Activity Communication from offender to target 62 1.07 .30
Activity Phishing is a criminal activity 61 0.72 .40




Activity Phishing uses websites 56 0.01 .93
Activity Phishing uses messages 51 1.07 .30
Actor Mentions a trusted third party 50 1.50 .22
Activity Phishing is fraud* 43 6.45 .01
Actor Mentions an offender* 40 9.64 .00




Activity Mentions the later abuse of information* 22 42.13 .00
Activity Related to identity theft* 20 47.16 .00
Activity Related to social engineering* 19 49.78 .00
χ2-test with df= 1. N= 113. Boldfaced concepts are included in standard. *p < 0.05.
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subjective decisions are mitigated by following a system-
atic protocol and discussing this, and the results of the
exercise, with senior researchers. Additionally, a second
researcher replicated the method. Cases where the sec-
ond rater disagreed with the initial rater were discussed,
which led to the inclusion of six definitions that had pre-
viously not been included. For the extraction of concepts,
differences were discussed, leading to no changes in the
18 included concepts.
By including peer-reviewed scientific literature only, we
were able to search systematically for all publications on
phishing in three digital libraries. Due to the goal of
this research, i.e., finding out how phishing is defined
in the research community, only scientific research was
included. Our design suffers from a publication bias,
since all included definitions are peer-reviewed. There
may be very comprehensive definitions beyond the scien-
tific domain. If this were to be the case, we assume that
a large number of research papers would reference this
definition.
Although our approach of selecting publications covers
a large set of the available literature, there is the possibil-
ity of not including a relevant publication. However, we
minimise this potential bias by selecting based on cita-
tion count (i.e., 10 or more), source (i.e., all journals) and
including recent conference papers (i.e., from 2013 and
the latest 20 from 2012). If a definition of high importance
to the field has been established, it is likely to have been
cited by many. In addition, if an included paper cites a
definition from another publication, the cited publication
is included in our dataset, thereby further decreasing the
potential of missing of a key definition. Finally, due to the
large number of definitions, it is unlikely that the results
would have been different by including a small number of
additional definitions.
The extraction of concepts was based on a sample of
the definitions, which could result in certain concepts not
being included.Wemitigated this by comparing all defini-
tions against the identified concepts, to find out whether
any definition had a different concept. Additionally, as
mentioned before, another researcher reviewed a random
sample of the publications. A consequence of a consensual
definition is that is it based on concepts that are used in
the majority of the source definitions.We did not conduct
any quality assessment of the publications. The quality
control was implicitly performed by including all journal
articles and highly cited conference papers.
Results
The total sample of selected publications consisted of
roughly 22% (n = 536) of the available peer-reviewed
literature. This subset of the literature covers highly cited
publications, journal articles and recent publications. The
selection covers, in our opinion, most of the important
literature on phishing. After review, 113 distinct defini-
tions were extracted from the peer-reviewed literature.
The definitions were analysed at the level of words and
concepts.
The word cloud (Figure 2) shows the results of the
frequency analysis that was used to analyse the words.
The five most-used words are information, website, user,
personal and email. From the figure, we can identify
the actors, assets and activities. Actors are user, victim,
attacker, bank and business. The assets that were found
are information, website, email, password, creditcard,
username and account. Finally, activities such as an attack,
social engineering, identity theft or spoofing are most often
used.
Eighteen concepts were extracted from the definitions
(Table 2). Two of these concepts are common to the rou-
tine activity approach: an offender and a target. There is
a weak relationship between usage of the concept social
engineering in the definition and the year of publication
(r(105) = .23, p = .015). This indicates that recent publi-
cations refer to social engineering more often than older
publications. The presence of other concepts and the year
of publication were not related, giving no evidence of
evolution of the definitions with regard to other concepts.
The concepts that are used most frequently in the def-
initions lead to the following phishing crime script. First,
the offender sends a communication to the target, which
62 of the definitions state. Typically, the offender sends
the target an email (n = 30) or sends a message using
a method that is not specified (n = 22), occasionally
Figure 2 A word cloud of the phishing definitions. A graphical
representation of the most-used words in the definitions called a
‘word cloud’. The font size represents the number of occurrences;
words in a larger font are used more than words in a smaller font.
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using other methods such as websites (Hodgson 2005;
Levy 2004; Olurin et al. 2012), social spaces (Piper 2007),
instant messages (Ali and Rajamani 2012; Verma et al.
2012), text messaging (Hinson 2010) or even letters
(Workman 2008). Then, the target may reply by send-
ing information to the offender, which is mentioned in
64 of the definitions, mostly through the use of a website
(n = 40). The information that is transmitted, according
to 113 definitions, can be categorised as: (1) authentica-
tion credentials (n = 13); (2) identity information (n = 5);
(3) sensitive information (n = 23); or (4) personal infor-
mation (n = 24). Variations or combinations account for
the remaining types of information.
The results of the analysis of concepts are shown in
Table 2. In the literature, there is a consensus that the
concepts of deception (n= 79), a target (n= 87), informa-
tion (n = 105), being digital (n = 87) and Internet-based
(n = 84) should be mentioned in a definition. Further-
more, the concepts of fraud (n= 43), an offender (n= 40),
persuasion (n = 30), the abuse of information (n = 22),
identity theft (n = 20) and social engineering (n = 19)
should not be included according to a significant majority
of the definitions. There is no consensus for the remaining
concepts.
Figure 3 shows the number of publications per year that
define phishing, indicating several peaks in the number of
definitions within particular years. Partly, this is due to the
criteria used in the literature selection. For example, the
peak in 2013 is due to the inclusion of all recent confer-
ence papers. However, that does not explain the decrease
of definitions in 2008, and the increase thereafter. Such
changes could indicate emerging consensus about the def-
inition, so that authors start citing earlier definitions they
consider useful, or, where there is a rise in the num-
ber of definitions, a change in the phenomenon might be
developing, requiring redefinition.
The research field and affiliation of the first author show
that mostly researchers located in the USA (n = 53) or in
the field of Computer Science (n = 88) define phishing.
Other countries in which the first author is located include























Figure 3 Number of publications with a definition of phishing,
till August 2013.
(n = 7) and Australia (n= 6). There is a significant corre-
lation between the year of publication and the first author
being affiliated within the USA (r(105)= -.46, p< 0.001)),
indicating that recent definitions originate more often
from countries other than the USA. Almost no defini-
tions originate from research fields other than Computer
Science, with Psychology (n= 4) or Law (n= 3) as largest
contributors. For 14 authors, it was not possible to estab-
lish the research field (for example, when the first author
is a journalist). A possible reason for the large number
of computer scientists who produce their own definition
of phishing, is that they feel more inclined or capable
to define phishing, whereas researchers from other fields
would rather use another author’s definition, or none
at all.
Discussion
The present study identified concepts of phishing accord-
ing to the peer-reviewed literature. There is a consensus
on most concepts, with seven concepts present in approx-
imately half of the definitions. We discuss each of these
concepts and consider whether they should be included
in the definition. However, we first observe that the con-
cept ‘Internet-based’ is a subset of the concept ‘digital’
and therefore, one is redundant. As Internet-based is the
most precise concept, arguably it should be included in
the definition. This, however, leads to the discrepancy
that instant messaging through an Internet-based appli-
cation on a phone can be phishing, whereas a regular
text message on a phone cannot (not Internet-based),
even though both methods are essentially the same. In
our view, phishing was made possible due to the ability
to mass-distribute messages. Whereas the Internet has
served as a catalyst, in facilitating communication cost
efficiently, it is not the only way to do so. We propose
to replace the concepts of Internet-based and digital with
scalability. Being scalable refers to the ease of scaling
from a single occurrence to hundreds, thousands or mil-
lions. Whereas digital specifies the encoding used for the
channel (in bits, ‘0’ or ‘1’) and Internet-based is a specific
channel, scalability only requires the channel to support
mass-distribution.
We decided to exclude the concept of ‘mentioning a
trusted third party’ (included in 50 of the definitions) in
favour of impersonation (n= 60), since deception through
impersonation by abusing the target’s trust implies the
existence of a trusted third party. The communication
between a target and an offender is mentioned in slightly
over half of the definitions (n = 62 and n = 64). However,
we decided to exclude the explicit mentioning of commu-
nication, as this follows from the exchange of information
from a target to an offender. Using websites (n = 56)
or messages (n = 51) as specific channels for phishing
were not included since these are absent from a significant
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majority of the definitions. Phishing as a criminal activ-
ity is not included in the list of essential concepts, even
though 61 of the definitions mention this, as it is included
in deception and furthermore depends on legislation in a
particular jurisdiction.
Consequently, the concepts of deception, imperson-
ation, target, information and scalability are the most
important aspects of a phishing definition. Therefore, we
propose a definition of phishing that comes out of the syn-
thesis of literature and includes all the important concepts
that existing definitions have in common:
Phishing is a scalable act of deception whereby
impersonation is used to obtain information from a
target.
A first observation is that our definition provides a high
level of abstraction, compared to most alternatives. This
derives from the method used. The consequence of this is
that there are no details about specific methods (such as
email or websites) required to perform a phishing attack.
By comparing our definition to those in Table 1, it can be
seen that our definition is sufficiently abstract to be com-
patible with the dictionary and APWG definitions. The
Oxford, Collins and Merriam-Webster definitions can be
mapped entirely onto our definition, as they are more spe-
cific. For example, our definition does not include the
offender’s misuse of the obtained information, such as
identity theft. The APWG definition is compatible as well,
although it is much more specific to what is considered
phishing. For example, the APWG definition specifically
mentions ‘technical subterfuge’ schemes that tamper with
a target’s PC, such as installing a virus, whereas our
definition – being broader – states that deception and
impersonation are used. Whether or not this is followed
by, or consists of, technical subterfuge, is not mentioned.
Therefore, we consider the APWG definition to be com-
patible to ours. Finally, the American Heritage definition
is the only one that is not completely compatible, since
it mentions the use of a telephone, which does not scale
well.
The methods employed in phishing could be used
long before the Internet became popular. However, the
term phishing only arose around 1995–1996 (James 2005;
Khonji et al. 2013; Press 2013; Purkait 2012), indicat-
ing that mass-communication is one of the founda-
tions of phishing. Another factor contributing to the
success of phishing on the Internet is that it is cost-
effective for mass-communication (i.e., spreadingmillions
of messages). Although both are potential forms of mass-
communication, letters and telegraph messages are more
costly to employ on a large scale, whereas sending emails
over the Internet is cheaper. This contributed to the suc-
cess of the Internet as a channel for phishing. Other
channels, such as telegraph messages or text messages,
can be scalable, apart from the potentially high costs of
sending millions of messages.
Only one indication of the evolution of phishing def-
initions was found: the tendency to refer to Social
Engineering in papers that are more recent. However,
there could still have been evolution within the litera-
ture on the act of phishing. For example, authors may
have identified specific methods of phishing through-
out the years, which in our analysis were mapped onto
the same concept. Additionally, recent publications that
define phishing more often have a first author with an
affiliation not in the USA, whereas early definitions orig-
inate mainly from the USA. This could indicate that
authors from outside the USA feel the need to redefine
phishing because of local differences, or indicate more
international interest in phishing. However, this could also
be a result of the inclusion criteria (i.e., publication in
English), or more interest or funding in the United States
for phishing research.
Conclusions
The goal of this research was to identify a consensual def-
inition of phishing from the literature. In the literature
search, 113 different definitions were found, indicating
that many researchers have thought about a definition
of phishing. We identified the core concepts which the
research community agrees are part of phishing, result-
ing in a consensual definition: ‘Phishing is a scalable act of
deception whereby impersonation is used to obtain infor-
mation from a target’.
The principles of phishing were used by offenders long
before the advent of the computer and the Internet. Before
computers became a consumer product, these principles
were considered a type of fraud. Digitalisation and mass-
communication through networks provide new channels
to exploit the same human vulnerabilities on a larger scale.
The Internet opened many opportunities for new types
of fraudulent behaviour, such as phishing. Phishing on
particular channels is sometimes named differently, such
as SMSishing (channel is SMS). We consider these types
of phishing if they fit the consensual definition that we
developed.
The implications for other definitions are mainly caused
by the concepts scalable, deception and impersonation.
Phishing must use deception by impersonation in order
to be called phishing. When no impersonation is used,
for example just asking for information, the act cannot be
called phishing. Furthermore, it should be easy to scale,
implying that one-to-one communication, such as a phone
call, is not phishing. Spear phishing, which is phishing
with a single target, is possible, as long as the employed
method supports scalability.
The main theoretical contribution of this study is three-
fold. Firstly, we validated the findings of Hutchings and
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Hayes (2009), Reyns et al. (2011) and Pratt et al. (2010)
that the routine activity approach, developed for explain-
ing crime in the physical world, can be applied to the
digital world. Within the context of phishing, routine
activities include, for example, giving one’s email address
away, time spent on the Internet, time spent on email.
Such routine activities could lead to more opportunity
for victimisation. Additionally, we suggest the notion of
crime facilitation to be relevant to cybercrime, and specif-
ically phishing. People can deliberately, negligently or
unconsciously facilitate their own victimisation by plac-
ing themselves at special risk Sparks (1982). The second
theoretical contribution of this research is the develop-
ment of a consensual definition of phishing. Yar (2012)
states that networked communications act as a force-
multiplier and that the impact is further increased by
a space-time compression, whereby actions can occur
almost instantly in different locations. Therefore, he
argues that new theoretical notions are required for the-
orising about cybercrime. We believe these notions are
manifested in the concept ‘scalability’ of the consensual
definition and therefore constitute the third theoretical
contribution.
This research adds a consensual definition of phishing
to the body of existing definitions so that others can be
weighed against the concepts with consensus within the
research community. Research can be aligned by using a
common definition, thereby avoiding misinterpretations.
Researchers who define phishing differently can relate
their definition to the consensual one, thus positioning
better which actions they consider phishing. Furthermore,
meta-studies on phishing are better facilitated with our
definition. Institutions, such as the police or banks, ben-
efit from a consensual definition as well. Collaboration
and data sharing between different organisations is eas-
ier if both have a common vocabulary. Organisations
labelling phishing incidents according to a consensual def-
inition will find it easier to compare the effectiveness of
countermeasures.
Future research could focus on translating and inter-
preting the consensual definition into other languages.
The consensual definition can be related to the definitions
that practitioners use, thereby extending this study into
the non-scientific domain. Furthermore, a discussion in
the research community should establish more clarity on
the concepts where there is no consensus at this moment.
We believe that the lessons learned in crime science and
the theories and tools that crime scientists developed,
should be applied to phishing. In particular, we suggest
studying the notion of crime facilitation in cybercrime,
in addition to crime opportunity. Ultimately, a collabora-
tion of crime science and computer science could help in
reducing phishing victimisation and avoid reinventing the
wheel.
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